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Abstract: 
In this paper, I examine why forecasters inaccurately predict the annual growth rate of real GDP 
in late 1990s (the dot com boom) and early 21st century. I argue that forecasters herd around the 
lagged consensus (the mean forecast) which, when uninformative, leads them to converge to the 
wrong prediction. Using data from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators newsletter and the Real 
Time Research Center at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia for the 1994-2002 period, I 
econometrically test for the presence of herding and its impact on accuracy. The results suggest 
that (1) forecasters do herd to “the wisdom of the crowd”, (2) forecaster herding propensities and 
forecaster accuracy vary from year to year (3) greater forecaster herding leads to greater 
inaccuracy during the “new economy boom” of the late 1990s.  
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1. Introduction 
 Good forecasts should be unbiased, efficient, and have serially uncorrelated 
errors. An unbiased forecast is one that is, on average, neither above nor below the actual 
value of the forecasted variable. That is, the forecast error has a mean of zero. An 
efficient forecast is one that incorporates all available information. Finally, the absence of 
serially correlated errors implies that if, for example, the forecaster underestimated GDP 
growth this month they tend not to do so in the next month. That is, forecasters learn 
from their mistakes and do not make systematic errors 
 To study macroeconomic forecasts, economists have utilized forecasts made by 
professional forecasters collected in various surveys. For example, Schuh (2001) 
examines forecasts from three different surveys: the Survey of Professional Forecasters, 
the Blue Chip survey and a survey of economists conducted by the Wall Street Journal. 
He finds that participants in the Survey of Professional Forecasters persistently and 
collectively under-forecast GDP growth during the late 1990s.  That is, from 1996 to 
1999 every forecaster in the panel provided a GDP growth forecast that was too low 
relative to actual growth subsequently observed.  This is a stunning observation and 
suggests that the forecasters were using the wrong model to predict the future behavior of 
the macroeconomic system.   
Given that this collective error in the second half of the 1990s occurred during the 
“new economy” boom suggests that structural changes in the economy may have played 
a role. The late 1990s was dubbed the dot com boom. Computers and the internet were 
becoming integrated into production processes and services at a pace far greater than 
anyone could anticipate. Consequently, the productivity of the individual worker rose 
 
 
3 
substantially and this led to rapid economic growth. Forecasters had not taken this into 
account and their estimates deviated significantly from the actual growth rate. Yet, it 
could not have been the sole reason for their inaccuracy. It took forecasters a long time to 
incorporate this information into their forecasts. Why?   
  In this thesis, I utilize forecasts made by the panel of Blue Chip forecasters to 
study forecasting performance during the 1990s and early part of the 21st century. 
Specifically, I address two questions of importance. First, does the same pattern observed 
by Schuh (2001) appear in the Blue Chip panel?  Second, if so, how can we explain the 
tendency of economists to persistently under-forecast economic growth during the boom 
of 1990s and over-forecast during the bust of the early 21st century?  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the forecast data from the 
Blue Chip Economic Indicators newsletter and actual Real GDP data from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia2. In this section, I also highlight the controversial debate 
surrounding the question of an appropriate benchmark (i.e. the actual Real GDP growth 
estimate) for assessing forecast accuracy. Section 3 provides a review of previous 
literature on the sources of forecast error. Section 4 engages in discussion of the literature 
and theory of herding. Section 5 focuses on the econometric analysis of the herding 
propensities of forecasters and the relationship between herding and forecast accuracy. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Source: http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/ 
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2. Forecast and Actual Data 
2.1 Blue Chip Data 
 Since 1976, monthly forecasts made by a set of professional forecasters have been 
collected and reported in the Blue Chip Economic Indicators newsletter. Forecasts for 
GNP growth, inflation and other major variables are collected by phone during the first 
three days of each month and disseminated in a newsletter in the same month.  In the case 
of GDP growth, forecasters begin making predictions for the current year in January (a 
12-month-ahead forecast) and subsequently revise these forecasts in the following 
months. This continues until December when the forecasters make their final predictions 
for the current year3.  
The Blue Chip survey data has several advantages over the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters which is managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. First, the 
Blue Chip forecasters are not anonymous and compete with one another for fame and 
fortune in the forecasting business. Thus, they have an incentive to forecast accurately. 
Secondly, the Blue Chip forecasts are used by policymakers and receive much attention 
in the press. Finally, the composition of forecasters in the Blue Chip Panel is diverse and 
includes forecasts from economists working in investment banks, commercial banks, 
econometric modeling firms and even the government. Table 1, below, provides a 
breakdown, by industry4, of firms present in the entire Blue Chip data set.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Forecasts for the GNP growth rate of the following year are also predicted but I do not focus on these for the sake of 
brevity. 
4 Laster et al. (1997) provides the types of classification. 
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Table 1 
Firm Distribution in Blue Chip Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All the firms in the table provided forecasts for the Blue Chip survey for some interval of time between 
January 1976 and December 2003. 
 
The more ambiguous industry types are Independents, Econometric Modeling 
Firms and Other. Econometric Modeling Firms include entities such as Macroeconomic 
Advisors and UCLA Business Forecast. A lot of econometric modeling firms will be part 
of research universities. Independents are different because they are private firms. Such 
firms include Turning Points (Micrometrics) and Econoclast. Finally, the industry type 
Other includes rating agencies, government agencies and insurance companies. 
One disadvantage with the Blue Chip panel is that the composition of forecasters 
in each year is constantly changing. Though the table above accounts for more than 100 
firms in the Blue Chip panel since 1976, not all firms (1) appear simultaneously and (2) 
forecast consistently from January 1976 to December 2003. In fact, numerous firms are 
constantly entering and exiting. This makes it slightly difficult to identify a large group of 
forecasters who forecast for the sample period under observation, 1994-2002. However, I 
do manage identify 31 forecasters that appear consistently between 1994 and 2002. Table 
2 in the appendix summarizes the important characteristics of the 31 forecasters. 
 
 
 
Type of firm Total in each category 
Commercial Banks 31 
Securities Firms 17 
Independents 21 
Econometric Modeling 
Firms 
11 
Industrial Corporation 16 
Other 13 
Unknown 15 
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2.2 Actual GDP Growth Data  
 To measure the accuracy of GDP growth forecasts, economists need actual 
estimates of GDP growth rates. This task is not as easy as it might seem because the U.S. 
Department of Commerce produces a number of different estimate of GDP over time as 
more information about the economy is revealed. The advance estimate is released a 
month after the end of the previous quarter and uses incomplete information about 
economic activity in that quarter. This estimate is revised and released the next month as 
a preliminary estimate and the month after that as a final estimate. In addition, each 
summer the Commerce Department undertakes annual revisions of data for the previous 
three years. Finally, benchmark revisions (revisions involving changes in macroeconomic 
definitions or accounting identities) are made every five years. 
 In 1991 the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia created the Real Time Research 
Center which collated real time macro-economic data beginning in November 19655. The 
primary objective was to give economists and policymakers the opportunity to analyze 
macro-economic policies and their effects given the information set available at the time 
(Croushore and Stark 2000, pg. 16). Thus researchers no longer had/ have to dig through 
old publications of the Commerce Department to obtain advance, preliminary and final 
estimates of GDP; the Real Time Research Center makes this data available on their 
website to researchers. The Center continues to produce a new vintage every three 
months, which contains real time data that would have been available to an economic 
analyst in the middle of the previous quarter. Each new vintage also contains revised 
actual data for all previous quarters beginning from 1947:Q1. 
                                                 
5 They collected and manually entered the data from reports produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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There has been much controversy between economists and policymakers about 
which actual estimate- – advance, preliminary, final or latter ones that include benchmark 
revisions - is a better benchmark for measuring accuracy. Zarnowitz (1992) summarizes 
the debate most aptly: 
The preliminary figures are most closely related to the latest figures that were available to the 
forecasters, but they may themselves be partly predictions or “guesstimates” and may seriously 
deviate from “the truth” as represented by the last revision of the data. On the other hand, the final 
data may be issued years after the forecast was made and may incorporate major benchmarks. That 
the forecasters should be responsible for predicting all measurement errors to be corrected by such 
revisions, is surely questionable. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the forecasting tendencies of forecasters, which 
are predicated on the information set available to them. Therefore, it seems most 
appropriate to judge their performance relative to the advance estimates. Additionally, it 
seems that forecasts revised several years later distort reality. The latter data undergo (1) 
revisions using information from income tax records and economic census data collected 
the year after and (2) benchmark revisions every five years (which, as mentioned earlier, 
involve changes to macroeconomic definitions or accounting principles). For example, in 
1977, the first quarter growth rate as per the May 1977 vintage was 5.2 percent. In 
August 1979, new information changed the estimate to 8.9 percent. In 1980, a national 
benchmark revision increased the estimate to 9.6 percent (Croushore and Stark 2000, 
p19). It would be asking a lot of forecasters for them to foresee the changes in the way 
the government measures the growth rate of GNP. Therefore, it is best to assess their 
performance relative to the advance estimates for annual GDP growth. 
For the purpose of assessing the accuracy of the Blue Chip panel, Figures 1-3 plot 
individual forecasts for the annual growth rate of Real GNP for the months of March, 
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Figure 1 
Blue Chip Forecast Performance by Month for 1994-2002 
June and October, respectively, from 1994-2002. The graphs also plot the advance 
estimates for each year as a benchmark to measure forecaster performance. Each figure 
contains a series of box plots which depict the range of forecasts for the annual growth 
rate of GNP. The box (minus the tails) provides information about forecasts that fall 
between the 25th-75th percentile. The dark line inside each box represents the median (50th 
percentile) forecast. The tip of the top tail represents the highest forecast in the group 
while the tip of the lower tail represents the lowest forecast in the group. Hence, the 
greater the length of the box and the further apart the tips of the two tails, the greater the 
diversity of forecasts. That is, the variance of forecasts is higher.  
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Two observations about these figures warrant discussion.  First, the Blue Chip 
group persistently under-forecasted GDP growth much like we saw with the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters as pointed out by Schuh (2001).  In particular, each member of 
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the Blue Chip group under-forecasted GDP growth for four years in a row from 1996 to 
1999 when we focus on the 10-month-ahead forecasts made in March.  Similarly, each 
member of the Blue Chip group over-forecasted GDP growth during the 2001 recession. 
This is a remarkable observation and suggests that it took forecasters several years to 
figure out that the process driving economic growth during the 1990s had changed.  
Second, forecasts made later in the year (October) cluster more around the median 
and appear to be more accurate.  Greater clustering is expected because uncertainty about 
the state of the economy is reduced as we move through the year and it is expected the 
less forecaster uncertainty should be associated with less disagreement across forecasters.   
is striking that every forecaster still under-forecasted GDP growth in 1996, 1997 and 
1998 when forecasting three months before the end of the year.   Moreover, the median 
forecasts for 2000 and 2002 made in October were much less accurate than the median 
forecasts made in March of that year and the tight clustering around the former suggests 
that all forecasters over-forecasted 2000 GDP growth by a wide margin in October. Each 
of these forecasters then proceeded to over-forecast GDP growth in the recession year of 
2001.  
Likewise, with greater information it is expected that forecasters will be, as a 
group, more accurate.  We see this in the data as the median forecast generally moves 
closer to the actual GDP growth as we move from Figure 2 to Figure 4.  Nevertheless, it 
 
3. Forecast error literature 
The process of forecasting is analogous to estimating the amount of a time it takes 
to drive from A to B. To produce a time prediction, one needs to have a model complete 
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with parameter estimates which link travel time to its determinants. If the model is 
imperfect, our predictions are likely to be inaccurate.  
For example, when computing traveling time, we must take into consideration 
factors such as speed, distance, weather, etc. However, it is possible that we might fail to 
include some important variables or include the wrong variables. These two forms of 
model misspecification have negative consequences for accuracy. 
 It might also be the case that a particular factor’s relationship with the traveling 
time changes. Consider the quality of the roads from A to B. In the past, road quality was 
of little importance because it was guaranteed that the roads were good. However, with 
the steady deterioration over time, it might take much longer to reach B. This will change 
the parameter linking the dependent and independent variables (parameter estimation) 
and lead to greater inaccuracy.  
Finally, it is possible that you fail to account for a certain factor which occurs 
intermittently but has a powerful impact on the traveling time. For example, suppose that 
on your journey, you encounter a car crash which causes traffic to pileup. In this 
situation, your traveling time is negatively affected by the unexpected shock.  
Similarly, scholars argue that such problems affect forecast accuracy. For a better 
understanding, assume the model adopts the following form: 
(1)  
 
where Yt represents an N*1 vector of endogenous variables, Xt-i is a N*K vector of 
exogenous variables, εt is an N*1 vector of disturbance terms at time t and α, β and δ are 
parameter matrices. To forecast using this model, the parameter matrices must be 
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estimated (usually with historical data) and used to project into the future. Hence, we get 
the following model:  
(2)  
 
 
 As I mentioned earlier, the forecasting model can be mis-specified in two ways: 
the inclusion of irrelevant variables and/or the exclusion of relevant variables. Zarnowitz 
(1997), for example, points out that historically there were two types of business cycle 
theorists, old and new theorists. The classic (or old) business cycle literature, from the 
1890s through the 1960’s, focused on “internal dynamics of capitalistic economies: how 
their component activities interact in successive phases of the process, with what 
differential timing and intensities and why” (p.4). Contrarily, the more recent models of 
business cycles rely more on exogenous shocks to explain business cycle fluctuations. If 
a forecaster uses the new theory to guide his model building and ignores some of the 
relevant variables or relationships suggested by the older theory, his model will produce 
forecasting errors that may be systematic. 
 Another example of model misspecification is the exclusion of The Index of 
Leading Indicators from Xt-i. Its omission could have negative consequences for forecast 
accuracy because the leading indicators might contain important market information. 
Batchelor and Dua(1998) examine the effect of including the Consumer Confidence 
Index (CCI) on forecast accuracy for Real GNP forecasts produced by US forecasters 
over the previous decade. Using Blue Chip data, the authors find that forecasts would 
have made smaller errors if they had used the CCI to modify their forecasts during the 
1991 recession. However, they conclude that their results cannot be generalized, i.e. 
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forecasters cannot exploit the relationship between forecast error and the CCI in other 
forecasting periods. 
Another source of forecast error concerns incorrect parameter estimation, namely 
estimates for α, β and δ matrices. It is evident from the diversity of forecasts that 
forecasters differ in their parameter estimates. This result might be a function of ideology 
and technique. Batchelor and Dua (1990) study the effect of different ideologies on the 
accuracy of forecasts. Using data they gathered through surveys of the Blue Chip 
forecasters, they find that no one ideology or technique produced consistently better 
estimates than others6. Unfortunately, their ambiguous result might be partially driven by 
the broadness of their definitions of ideologies and techniques. On this matter of 
parameter estimation, Zarnowitz (1997) brings to our attention that there is growing 
evidence in favor of the possibility that relationships between variables are not linear, not 
constant, but continuously changing during different phases of the business cycle. As the 
old business cycle theorists tried to argue, “booms generate excesses and imbalances that 
tend to be reduced in slowdowns and moderate recessions” (p. 4)  
 Finally, forecast errors could be exacerbated by unpredictable exogenous shocks. 
According to David Hendry and Neil Ericsson (2001), unanticipated shocks could result 
in (1) deterministic shifts or (2) stochastic changes. In the case of (1), we would witness a 
change in the mean of the dependent variable. For example, earthquakes or any such 
spontaneous deviations from the norm would cause the average annual growth rate of 
GDP to change drastically. Alternatively, stochastic shifts would change the time varying 
                                                 
6 To determine the ideologies and techniques used by Blue Chip forecasters, the authors requested Bob Eggert to 
include certain questions in his survey. In particular, the authors had Eggert ask forecasters how they would classify 
themselves (e.g. Keynesian, Monetarist) and which forecasting technique they preferred when forecasting (1)Real 
GNP, (2) Consumer price index and (3) Treasury bill rate.  
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error term incrementally but persistently. Both types of shocks are reflected in the error 
term of equation (1) and cause the predicted and actual outcome to differ even if the 
model is properly specified and the parameters are accurately estimated 
 As evident from the discussion above, scholars believe that inaccurate forecasts 
are driven mainly by three factors, namely model misspecification, incorrect parameter 
estimation and unpredictable shocks to the error term7.  
 
4. Herding 
 
 The preceding discussion assumed that forecasters generate forecasts by building 
a model and using it to project the future independent of what others are forecasting.  
However, the social learning literature suggests that humans rarely form expectations in a 
social vacuum and that they often take queues from those around them.  In some 
circumstances, listening to others can help one improve his or her forecast.  On the other 
hand, the more recent literature on information cascades and herding suggests that 
utilizing the information contained in the forecasts of others might lead a forecaster 
astray and cause them to produce inaccurate forecasts.  This examination of the link 
between information-based herding and forecast accuracy is exactly what allows this 
paper to make a unique contribution.  
 There are two main types of herding- reputation-based herding and information-
based herding.  Reputation-based herding occurs when forecasters are concerned about 
more than simply the accuracy of their predictions. According to Lamont (1995), there is 
a principal-agent problem wherein the agenda of the forecaster is different from that of 
the consumer of their forecasts. The forecaster is motivated by an incentive structure that 
                                                 
7 Some scholars argue that asymmetric loss functions and prior probabilities might lead forecasters to misforecast. See 
Stekler(1972) and Stekler and Schnaeder(2003). 
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rewards him on the basis of his reputation. His reputation is based upon two things, 
namely (1) how accurate he is and (2) how close or far he is with respect to the 
consensus. The latter is important when the consumers of forecasts cannot judge the 
quality of a forecaster solely on their short-term performance and they perform in an 
environment where “bright minds think alike.”  Lamont finds that earlier in their careers, 
forecasters care more about reputation and tend to forecast close to the consensus. But as 
these young forecasters become older, they care less about reputation and make more 
radical forecasts. Given that mean forecast of a group tends, over time, to be more 
accurate than most forecasts of individual group members, one result of this is that older 
forecasters have relatively greater inaccuracy. 
 The second type of herding is information-based herding. Unlike reputation 
herding, an individual is said to herd informationally if he chooses to mimic the actions 
of others regardless of his private information signal. The motivation for this type of 
herding is not to fool or mislead the consumer of the forecasts, but simply to increase 
forecast accuracy by exploiting the information contained in the forecasts of others. 
Forecasting literature such as Batchelor and Dua(1992) and Ferderer, Pandey and 
Veletsianos(2005)8 examines the information herding tendencies of macro-forecasters, 
but does not address whether herding affects accuracy.  
 To illustrate the impact of information-based herding, I rely on Bikhchandani and 
Sharma (2001).  The scholars explain the model by using an example involving investors 
investing in a certain stock. They set certain rules and conditions to simplify the model. 
                                                 
8 Batchelor and Dua(1992) examines how important the lagged individual consensus and the mean consensus forecast 
are to forecasters. They find that forecasters tend to move toward the consensus because they are conservative and 
not because they are herding. Ferderer, Pandey and Veletsianos(2005) examine whether forecasters herd and if so, 
which model, information herding or reputation herding, better explains their herding tendencies. 
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First, for each of the N investors, the value of the outcome relative to that of the next best 
investment, V, can be either +1 or -1 with equal probability. Second, investors must make 
their investment decisions in a sequential order, which is determined exogenously. The 
sequence creates an opportunity for investors to observe and (maybe) be influenced by 
the actions of their predecessors. Third, aside from being privy to the actions of others, 
each investor also receives his own private information signal about the stock. The signal 
can be either good (G) or bad (B). Finally, if V=+1, the probability of getting a good 
signal is p and the probability of getting a bad signal is 1-p where 0.5<p<1. As p rises, the 
signals are more informative. 
 Now, let Investor 1 act first. If he receives signal G (B) then he will invest (not 
invest). Since the first investor has no one to observe, he must follow his private signal. 
Investor 2 moves next. If he receives signal G and he sees that Investor 1 has invested, he 
will invest. For Investor 2, the actions of Investor 1 will confirm the veracity of his 
private signal G. However, if he receives signal B and he sees that Investor 1 invested, he 
will be indifferent since there is an equal probability that either one of them is right. For 
the sake of simplicity, let us assume he received G and invested accordingly. Now it is 
Investor 3’s move. He sees that both 1 and 2 invested. From this he will infer (maybe 
incorrectly) that both received signal G. If he has a signal B, he will ignore it because he 
will assume that the likelihood that two people before him were wrong is less than the 
likelihood that his signal is wrong (i.e. the superiority of the wisdom of the crowd)9. 
Mathematically, Investor 3 will think of the probability of being wrong despite getting 
signal G as the probability that V=-1 despite an information signal G is (1-p). In some 
                                                 
9 If has signal G, he has no reason not to follow the first two investors since the probability of V=+1 given a good 
signal is greater than 0.5. 
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cases, this will lead him to make the correct decision. However, arriving at the correct 
outcome is conditional on the fact that the previous investors are guided by informative 
private signals. If not, Investor 3, along with all the investors who are acting on his 
decision, will converge to the wrong target. Such a cascade of incorrect predictions is 
known as a negative information cascade.  
 The information cascade model offers a foundation for the econometric models to 
follow. In the next section, I discuss the models that I use to test for information-based 
herding and its effect on forecast accuracy, the basic econometric obstacles that arise 
when dealing with panel data, ways to overcome the obstacles, and the results.  
 
5. Econometric Analysis 
 Testing for herding and its effect on accuracy is a two stage process. The first 
stage involves quantifying the herding tendencies of forecasters. The second stage 
involves testing the correlation between the quantifiable measure of herding and a 
measure of forecast accuracy.  
 
5.1 Measuring Herding 
 To measure herding behavior across the 1994-2002 period, I follow Gallo, 
Granger and Jeon(2002). Gallo, Granger and Jeon(2002) formulate an econometric model 
for testing herding behavior. They argue that a forecaster’s forecast is built on three 
factors: (1) a persistence in one’s own most recent forecast (the lagged individual 
forecast), (2) an imitation effect of the average belief expressed in the previous period by 
the group (the lagged consensus10 or the “wisdom of the crowd” variable) and (3) an 
                                                 
10 Since Blue Chip forecast data is monthly, the lagged consensus is the average forecast of all forecasters in the 
previous month. January is the only month for which the lagged consensus cannot be calculated. 
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effect due to the desire to move closer together as the time-horizon advances (Granger p. 
12). Due to the fact that forecasters forecast simultaneously and not sequentially, they 
observe the actions of their fellow with a lag of one period. 
 The following econometric model is derived from Gallo, Granger and Jeon 
(2002):11
 
(3)  
  
for j = 11, 10, …, 1. The variable yiT,j is the forecast in year T of forecaster i for j periods 
ahead, yiT,j+1 is the most recent forecast produced by forecaster i, ŷT,j+1, is the lagged 
consensus forecast, and µ iT,j is the disturbance term which captures other information 
used in the forecast other than the lagged individual forecast and consensus forecast. 
Lastly, wi1 and wi2 represent the weights attached by forecaster i to the most recent 
forecast and the lagged consensus respectively. The latter is the key parameter to estimate 
because it provides a measure of the degree to which each forecaster puts weight on the 
forecasts of others when updating their own individual forecast. 
 Before discussing the results, it is important to address certain issues that arise 
when dealing with panel data. One such obstacle in panel data estimation is serially 
correlated errors. With Blue Chip data, serial correlation is unavoidable due to the fact 
that forecasters continuously incorporate old information into their estimates. However, 
model (3) solves the problem of serial correlation by including (1) the individual lagged 
forecast from one period back which captures all previous information since January and 
(2) the lagged consensus forecast which also captures past information. Another concern 
is the presence of heteroskedasticity. To test for heteroskedasticity, I use one cross 
                                                 
11 In my model, I include the most recent forecast and the lagged consensus but do not include the forecast variance.   
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section (data from any year) of my panel data set. The test statistic for heteroskedasticity 
is not significant at the 5 percent level.  
 Now, Table 3 on page 18 displays the herding propensities (wi2) and the reliance 
on the lagged individual forecast (wi1) for 31 forecasters over the 1994-2002 sample 
period. One interesting result is that of the 22 forecasters that herd significantly, the 
coefficients on lagged consensus range from a maximum of 1.099 to a minimum of 
0.191. This suggests that some forecasters derived the forecast at time T almost entirely 
from the lagged consensus while other forecasters placed very little weight on the lagged 
consensus. Another curious, though insignificant, result is the negative coefficient on 
lagged consensus (-0.051) for forecaster 70. This implies that the forecaster actually 
deviated from the consensus rather than herding to it. Overall, the results suggest that 
forecasters (1) engage in information herding and (2) herd to the lagged consensus.  
The results in Table 3 are informative of the general herding behavior of 
forecasters over the entire sample 1994-2002 but they bring to bear the question of 
whether forecasters constantly herd with the same intensity. A priori, there is little reason 
to believe that the tendency to herd will remain the same each year. For example, the 
level of difficulty involved in forecasting might differ each year and this could alter the 
incentive to mimic the forecasts of others. Consider 2001. With the occurrence of the 
recession, it might have been much harder to get an informative private signal to forecast 
the growth rate (i.e., forecasters were more uncertain). Therefore, forecasters might herd 
more to exploit the wisdom of the crowd.   
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Table 3 
Forecaster Herding to Lagged Consensus 1994-2002 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the forecast made by the respective forecaster at time T, j months ahead of 
December. Significance at ten percent, five percent and one percent level is denoted by *, ** and *** respectively.  
 
ID 
 
Lagged Consensus 
( ŷT,j+1 ) 
T-stat 
(pvalue) 
Lagged individual 
forecast 
(yiT,j+1 ) 
T-stat 
(pvalue) 
R-squared 
5 0.068 
 
0.56  
(0.57300) 
0.930 8.19  
(0.00000)*** 
0.932 
6 0.393 
 
2.78 
(0.00700)*** 
0.603 4.26  
(0.00000)*** 
0.933 
17 0.347 
 
1.83  
( 0.07000)* 
0.658 3.61  
(0.00100)*** 
0.927 
25 0.217 
 
2.30  
(0.02400)** 
0.774 8.02  
(0.00000)*** 
0.907 
26 0.295 
 
4.92   
(0.00000)*** 
0.734 12.27  
(0.00000)*** 
0.953 
31 0.746 
 
5.70 
(0.00000)*** 
0.255 2.01  
(0.04800)** 
0.948 
37 0.353 
 
3.01  
(0.00300)*** 
0.672 6.09   
(0.00000)*** 
0.930 
39 0.530 
 
6.49  
(0.00000)*** 
0.476 5.63  
(0.00000)*** 
0.955 
41 0.107 
 
1.61 
(0.11000) 
0.939 13.46  
(0.00000)*** 
0.966 
43 0.191 
 
2.22  
(0.02900)** 
0.816 9.45  
(0.00000)*** 
0.921 
48 1.099 
 
9.45  
(0.00000)*** 
-0.085 -0.74  
(0.46000) 
0.957 
50 0.715 
 
7.03  
(0.00000)*** 
0.267 2.55  
(0.01200)** 
0.939 
52 0.499 
 
5.87  
(0.00000)*** 
0.525 6.98  
(0.00000)*** 
0.935 
57 0.659 
 
6.36  
(0.00000)*** 
0.325 3.20 
 (0.00200)*** 
0.918 
70 -0.051 
 
-0.30   
(0.76400) 
1.054 6.17  
(0.00000)*** 
0.945 
73 0.103 
 
0.74   
(0.46000) 
0.901 6.83 
 (0.00000)*** 
0.938 
79 0.050 
 
0.58  
( 0.56600) 
0.933 12.39  
(0.00000)*** 
0.946 
82 0.817 
 
8.71  
(0.00000)*** 
0.254 3.04 
 (0.00300)*** 
0.961 
84 0.426 
 
2.90  
(0.00500)*** 
0.577 3.82  
(0.00000)*** 
0.932 
85 0.880 
 
5.28  
(0.00000)*** 
0.117 0.72 
 (0.04730) 
0.933 
89 0.020 
 
0.12  
(0.90100) 
0.962 6.27  
(0.00000)*** 
0.927 
91 0.250 
 
1.13  
( 0.26200) 
0.710 3.60 
(0.00100)*** 
0.907 
97 0.202 
 
4.13  
(0.00000)*** 
0.814 14.14  
(0.00000)*** 
0.953 
98 0.814 
 
5.31 
(0.00000)*** 
0.220 1.49  
(0.14100) 
0.948 
105 0.583 
 
5.57  
(0.00000)*** 
0.426 3.99  
(0.97000)*** 
0.930 
108 0.542 
 
4.58 
(0.00000)*** 
0.503 4.31  
(0.00000)*** 
0.955 
111 0.871 7.25 
(0.00000)*** 
0.145 1.26  
(0.21200) 
0.966 
112 0.451 3.90  
(0.00000)*** 
0.598 5.76  
(0.00000)*** 
0.921 
114 0.234 2.91  
(0.00400) 
0.783 11.67  
(0.00000)*** 
0.957 
121 0.781 7.03 
(0.00000)*** 
0.193 1.68  
(0.09600)* 
0.939 
122 0.256 1.38 
 (0.17100) 
0.748 4.15 
 (0.00000)*** 
0.935 
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To test for time-varying (year-specific) coefficients on the lagged consensus, I 
measure the herding tendency of each forecaster in each year from 1994-2002. I utilize 
model (3) to conduct the regression but I run it separately for each year.  Table 4 on the 
next page presents the results.  
The results suggest that forecasters do not herd with the same intensity over time. 
In fact, it is interesting to observe the range of parameters for each forecaster. Most of the 
forecasters have minimum herding parameters below 0. This implies that in certain years 
they are actually deviating away from the lagged consensus. Similarly, many forecasters 
have maximum herding parameters above 1. This is not as surprising as it suggests that 
forecasters place great emphasis on the lagged consensus for information. Finally, with 
the exception of forecaster 89, all forecasters herd on average to the lagged consensus. 
 
5.2 Measuring the impact of herding on forecast accuracy 
The second stage of the analysis focuses on the relationship between the herding 
propensity and forecast accuracy. The forecasting literature provides a few ways to 
measure accuracy, namely the absolute error, squared error and mean squared error.12 
Initially, I employ the mean squared error because it penalizes large errors more than the 
absolute error does.  
 Figure 2 shows the scatter plot between the herding parameter and the mean 
squared error which are both estimated over the entire sample (1994-2002). The plot 
                                                 
12 These three measures are calculated differently. Absolute error is the absolute difference between the  actual and the 
estimated  values. Squared error is the square of the difference between the actual and the estimated values. Mean 
squared error is the average squared error.  
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focuses on the 10-month horizon in March. I also examine the relationship in June and 
October  but do not include those plots in the text13. I focus on these different horizons  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 The plots for June and October can be found in the appendix.  
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Table 4 
Time-variant Forecaster Herding to Lagged Consensus 
 
 
Notes: The table considers herding measures for each year for each forecaster regardless of whether it is 
significant at the ten, five or one percent level.  
 
 
ID 
 
Maximum Coefficient on 
Lagged Consensus 
Minimum Coefficient on 
Lagged Consensus 
Mean Coefficient on Lagged 
Consensus 
5 1.250 
 
-0.934 
 
0.490 
 
6 0.777 
 
-0.042 
 
0.389 
 
17 1.511 
 
-0.063 
 
0.673 
 
25 0.799 
 
-1.151 
 
0.152 
 
26 1.365 
 
-0.434 
 
0.425 
 
31 1.075 
 
0.102 
 
0.489 
 
37 1.239 
 
0.153 
 
0.745 
 
39 1.500 
 
-0.169 
 
0.720 
 
41 0.688 
 
-0.666 
 
0.121 
 
43 0.480 
 
-0.897 
 
0.107 
 
48 2.010 
 
0.008 
 
1.061 
 
50 1.540 
 
-1.169 
 
0.753 
 
52 1.128 
 
-0.249 
 
0.469 
 
57 1.737 
 
-1.148 
 
0.688 
 
70 0.921 
 
-0.836 
 
0.010 
 
73 1.814 
 
-0.883 
 
0.662 
 
79 0.750 
 
-0.045 
 
0.337 
 
82 2.460 
 
-0.027 
 
1.152 
 
84 1.308 
 
-0.385 
 
0.425 
 
85 1.680 
 
-0.536 
 
0.492 
 
89 0.691 
 
-1.797 
 
-0.023 
 
91 1.820 
 
-0.422 
 
0.566 
 
97 1.322 
 
-0.275 
 
0.523 
 
98 1.595 
 
-1.225 
 
0.859 
 
105 1.499 
 
0.209 
 
0.711 
 
108 1.607 
 
0.381 
 
0.928 
 
111 4.165 
 
0.127 
 
1.013 
 
112 0.724 
 
-0.983 
 
0.169 
 
114 1.302 
 
-0.431 
 
0.360 
 
121 1.544 
 
-0.108 
 
0.744 
 
122 1.515 
 
-0.258 
 
0.523 
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because they allow me to consider how systematic differences in uncertainty about the 
economy at various points in the year affect the result.  That is, on average there is more 
forecast uncertainty in March than in the other months and this has the potential to 
influence the propensity to herd and the link between herding and forecast errors.   
There are two things to note. First, though all three graphs seem to suggest that 
there is a slight positive relationship between the propensity to herd and the size of the 
forecast error, we cannot draw any firm conclusions since the best-fit line is insignificant. 
Secondly, as forecasters get closer to the end of the year, individual errors on average 
seem to decrease as does within group variance. However, once again the estimated 
slopes of the best- fit lines are insignificant.   
Figure 2 
Correlation between Herding and Accuracy in March (1994-2002) 
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To econometrically test the relationship between herding to the lagged consensus 
and forecast accuracy for three horizons in the 1994-2002 period, I utilize the following 
model: 
(4)   
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where MSEi is the mean squared error of forecaster i, wi is the herding parameter for 
forecaster i calculated in by model (3), and µ i
 
is the error term for forecaster i. Lastly, b is 
the coefficient on the herding parameter. In this case, there will be 31 forecasters, each 
having a mean squared error and a herding parameter.  
 Table 5 on the next page presents the results for model (4). First, the relationship 
between herding and accuracy is positive but insignificant. This confirms that we could 
not draw any concrete conclusions from the correlation graphs in Figure 2. Secondly, the 
steady decline in the coefficient of the constant term from March to October confirms 
that the forecast error on average decreases as the year passes.  
Table 5 
Relationship between Herding and Accuracy in March, June and October (1994-2002) 
 
Variables March June October 
Herding 0.0832 
(0.27) 
0.2003 
(1.07) 
0.0337 
(0.39) 
Constant 2.5952 
(16.27)*** 
1.7579 
(17.92)*** 
1.2896 
(28.47)*** 
R-squared 0.0026 0.0382 0.0052 
 
Notes: There are 31 observations for each forecaster.  T-statistics are indicated in parentheses. The 
ten, five and one percent levels of significance are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
  
As we saw above, the herding parameters varied a great deal over time. Given 
this, it might be the case that the relationship between herding and accuracy might also 
differ over time. As the literature on information cascades shows, people can get caught 
up in a positive cascade where they converge to the correct target and this affects 
accuracy. More importantly, they can also get caught up in a negative target where they 
mimic their predecessors and converge on the wrong target. To measure forecast 
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accuracy on a yearly basis, I use the squared error rather than the mean squared error 
because I only have one error per year.    
 Figure 3 on the next page plots yet again the correlation between the propensity to 
herd and forecast error. However, unlike in Figure 2, I utilize the time varying 
propensities to herd (like those displayed in Table 2) and squared errors for the 1994-
2002 period. Though Figure 3 only displays the plot for March, I also plot the 
relationship for June and October14. From the plot, it seems that the best-fit line has a 
negative slope. This suggests that as forecasters herd more, their accuracy increases. This 
result is at odds with the theory which suggests that increased herding will lead to 
increased inaccuracy. Once again, we must do further analysis to draw any concrete 
inferences about the relationship.  
Figure 3 
Correlation between Herding and Accuracy in March (1994-2002) 
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14 The plots for June and October can be found in the appendix. 
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 To examine the impact of herding on forecast accuracy more closely, I examine 
the relationship between herding propensities and squared errors in various sub-samples 
such as 1994-2000 and 1994-2002. I utilize the following econometric model: 
(5)   
where SiT represents the squared error forecaster i in year T, wiT represents the herding 
propensity for forecaster I (the time varying coefficient on the lagged consensus) in year 
T, and XT represents vector dummies for each year depending on the sub-sample. Finally, 
µ iT represents the error term for forecaster i in year T. This regression is estimated using 
data from the three months: March, June and October. The motivation for including year 
dummies is that the difficulty of forecasting differs across years. If the dummies are 
significant, it would support the decision to investigate the possibility of time varying 
accuracy.  . 
 Tables 6-8 display the results for March, June and October respectively. If you 
look closely the bolded results for the 1994-2002 sub-sample in Table 5, you will see that 
the year dummies from 1996-1999 are significant. Each of those coefficients is the 
difference between the intercept in the specific year and the intercept in the base year (in 
this case 1994). This suggests that the squared error is differs across years. That is, the 
difficulty of forecasting differs across years. It is interesting to note that the largest year 
dummy coefficient is D01. This might be because it was tough to forecast the growth rate 
in a recession year.  
In the 1994-2000 period, these year dummies are significant yet again. This is not 
surprising since the base year, 1994, has not changed. Once again, we see that 2001 is the 
year with the largest year dummy coefficient.  
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 The most interesting part of the result is positive and significant coefficient for 
Herding Propensity (0.191). This implies that when an individual forecaster increases 
their propensity to herd by 0.01, their accuracy decreases by 0.191. This is in accordance 
with the theory of herding and negative information cascades.  
 Finally, none of the coefficients on Herding Propensity in the other sub-samples is 
significant. The coefficients for Herding in 2001-2002 and 2001 are negative although 
insignificant. The year dummies continue to remain significant. However, the base year 
for the remaining samples is either 2001 or 2002.  
Table 6 
Relationship between Herding and Accuracy in March for various periods in 1994-2002 sample 
 
 
Note: Significance at the ten, five and one percent is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. T-statistics are provided in 
parentheses below the coefficients. The constant (intercept) represents the intercept for non-independent firms and for 
the year 1994 for the samples 1994-2002, 1994-2000. For 2001-2002, the constant (intercept) represents the intercept 
for non-independent firms and the year 2001. In the last two samples, the constant represents only the intercept for the 
non-independent firms and the specific year.  
  
 
Variables 1994-2002 1994-2000 2001-2002 2001 2002 
Herding 
Propensity 
.0726004 
( 0.60) 
.1909281  
(2.20)** 
-.4651842 
(-0.91) 
-1.396736  
(-1.25) 
.0650464 
(0.50) 
D94 
 
- - - - - 
D95 .5357633  
(1.65) 
.5595128 
(2.62)*** 
- - - 
D96 5.029182 
 (15.48)*** 
5.04676 
(23.71)*** 
- - - 
D97 2.220381 
(6.83)*** 
2.200529 
(10.33)*** 
- - - 
D98 
 
3.184481 
(9.72)*** 
3.166435  
(14.75)*** 
- - - 
D99 
 
.6625113 
(2.00)** 
.6435207 
(2.97)*** 
- - - 
D00 
 
-.2905294 
(-0.87) 
-.3004283 
(-1.38) 
- - - 
D01 
 
8.533079 
(25.70)*** 
- - - - 
D02 
 
-.0572873  
(-0.16) 
- -8.463015 
(-13.09)*** 
- - 
Constant 
 
.3917868  
(1.64) 
.325153 
( 2.06 ** 
9.05894 
(20.31)*** 
9.291184 
(14.74)*** 
.3381716 
( 2.96)*** 
R-squared 0.8306 0.8300 0.7853 0.0545 0.0113 
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 Table 7 displays the results for June. Once again, the coefficient of interest is the 
coefficient on Herding Propensity in the sub-sample 1994-2000 (.0803395) which 
remains positive and significant at the 10 percent level. However, the degree of 
correlation between herding propensity and accuracy diminishes relative to what we saw 
in March. In June, if an individual’s propensity to herd increases by 1 unit, his accuracy 
will decrease by .0803395 percent on average. 
The year dummies continue to remain significant in the 1994-2002 and the 1994-
2000 periods and are still to be interpreted as differences from the base year 1994. Once 
again, the intercept difference in 2001 is the largest. 
Table 7 
Relationship between Herding and Accuracy in June for various periods in 1994-2002 sample 
 
 
Variables 1994-2002 1994-2000 2001-2002 2001 2002 
Herding Propensity 
 
.0021878  
(0.03) 
  .0803395  
(1.91)* 
-.298167  
(-1.18) 
-.7621155  
(-1.31) 
-.0576031  
(-0.60) 
D94 
 
- - - - - 
D95 
 
.4913921  
(2.84)*** 
.5070779  
(4.93)*** 
- - - 
D96 
 
3.671884 
(21.24)*** 
3.683493 
(35.88)*** 
- - - 
D97 
 
.4335496  
(2.51)** 
.4204377   
(4.09)*** 
- - - 
D98 
 
1.707607  
(9.88)*** 
1.696686 
(16.53c)*** 
- - - 
D99 
 
-.0756751  
(-0.43) 
-.0854528  
(-0.82) 
- - - 
D00 
 
.2765204  
(1.57) 
.2728169  
(2.62)*** 
- - - 
D01 
 
7.491966 
(42.82)*** 
- - - - 
D02 
 
.3209745  
(1.81)* 
- -7.127628  
(-21.76)*** 
- - 
Constant 
 
.2439543  
(1.92)* 
.1999448  
(2.62)** 
7.820006  
(32.99)*** 
7.949891 
(23.00)*** 
.5902998 
(7.15)*** 
R-squared 0.9262 0.9093 0.8984 0.0576 0.0138 
 
Note: Significance at the ten, five and one percent is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. T-statistics are provided in 
parentheses below the coefficients. The constant (intercept) represents the intercept for non-independent firms and for 
the year 1994 for the samples 1994-2002, 1994-2000. For 2001-2002, the constant (intercept) represents the intercept 
for non-independent firms and the year 2001. In the last two samples, the constant represents only the intercept for the 
non-independent firms and the specific year.  
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Lastly, as was the case in March, the coefficient on Herding Propensity in all the 
other sub-samples remains insignificant. However, unlike the results from March, the 
coefficients for Herding Propensity in all sub-samples other than 1994-2000 are negative.  
  Finally, the results in October are displayed in Table 8. The most important 
change to note here is the lack of significance of the coefficient on Herding Propensity in 
the 1994-2000 sample. Though the coefficient is positive, it is no longer significant. 
Therefore, we cannot make any firm inferences about the relationship between herding 
and accuracy in October.  
Table 8 
Relationship between Herding and Accuracy in October for various periods in 1994-2002 sample 
 
Variables 1994-2002 1994-2000 2001-2002 2001 2002 
Herding 
Propensity 
 
-.0058398  
(-0.19) 
-.0247516  
(-0.89) 
.0766829  
(0.69) 
. .3061751 
(1.19) 
-.0427426  
(-1.42) 
D94 
 
- - - - - 
D95 
 
.451086  
(5.28)*** 
.4472902  
(6.54)*** 
- - - 
D96 
 
3.090455 
(36.25)*** 
3.087646 
(45.21)*** 
- - - 
D97 
 
.1904959  
(2.23)** 
.1936688  
(2.83)*** 
- - - 
D98 
 
1.338459 
(15.57)*** 
1.341344 
(19.48)*** 
- - - 
D99 
 
-.0521618  
(-0.60) 
-.0551197  
(-0.80) 
- - - 
D00 
 
.8927641 
(10.31)*** 
.8940515 
(12.89)*** 
- - - 
D01 
 
3.813034 
(43.76)*** 
- - - - 
D02 
 
-.0390205  
(-0.44) 
- -3.86863  
(-27.73)*** 
- - 
Constant 
 
.2323531  
(3.70)*** 
.2430029  
(4.79)*** 
4.024813 
(40.43)*** 
3.967599 
(27.46)*** 
.2099451  
(8.15)*** 
R-squared 0.9441 0.9393 0.9366 0.0500 0.0743 
 
Note: Significance at the ten, five and one percent is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. T-statistics are provided in 
parentheses below the coefficients. The constant (intercept) represents the intercept for non-independent firms and for 
the year 1994 for the samples 1994-2002, 1994-2000. For 2001-2002, the constant (intercept) represents the intercept 
for non-independent firms and the year 2001. In the last two samples, the constant represents only the intercept for the 
non-independent firms and the specific year.  
  
 
 
31 
 With regard to the year dummies, they continue to remain significant in the 1994-
2002 and 1994-2000 sample. Similarly, the coefficients on herding propensity in the 
remaining sub-samples remain insignificant. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, I wished to address two questions. First, do forecasters in the Blue 
Chip panel systematically under or over-estimate the growth rate of Real GDP in the 
period 1994-2002? The motivation for this question arises from the literature, specifically 
from Schuh (2001). In his paper, Schuh plots forecaster performance from 1968 to 2000 
against the actual growth rate and finds that participants in the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters systematically underestimate GDP growth for three years, 1996-1999. Using 
data for 31 forecasters from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators newsletter and the Real 
Time Research Center, I observe that the same phenomenon with Blue Chip forecasters. 
Additionally, I find that the Blue Chip panel overestimates in 2000-2002. This leads to 
the second question: how can we explain the panel’s persistent under-estimation in the 
late 1990s and the overestimation in the early 21st century? 
 To answer the second question, I argue that forecasters herd to the “wisdom of the 
crowd” and this negatively affects their accuracy. I test this hypothesis econometrically 
by (1) quantifying the herding propensities of forecasters and (2) determining their 
impact on accuracy. For part (1), I find that the general propensity to herd for 22 of the 31 
forecasters is significant at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level. However, it seems unreasonable 
to assume that forecasters herd with the same intensity over time. Upon further testing, I 
determine that the propensity to herd varies over time. 
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 With respect to (2), I test the relationship two ways. First, I model the time 
invariant propensity to herd and mean squared error and find that a positive but 
insignificant relationship. To examine it more closely, I decide to test year specific 
propensities to herd with squared errors. In this regression, I also include year dummies 
to examine whether the difficulty of forecasting varies over time.  I find that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between the herding propensity and squared errors in 
March and June over the sample 1994-2000. This suggests that if a forecaster herds more, 
their accuracy will go down. I also find that most of my year dummies are significant for 
the various sub-samples that I test (e.g. 1994-2002, 1994-2000, etc.).  
 On a final note, I believe that there are several avenues for further research. One 
possible course of research would be to examine whether forecast inaccuracy between 
1996 and 1999 was caused by a combination of factors, one of which was herding. The 
late 1990s is known as the boom of the new economy due to the dot-com bubble. Another 
possible avenue might be to examine whether herding and forecast accuracy by industry. 
As I mention in my paper, literature such as Laster et al (1996) argue that forecasts by 
firms in some industries are driven by motivations other than accuracy. This hypothesis 
has yet to be applied to the problem of information-based herding and forecast accuracy. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 2 
Information on 31 forecasters in 1994-2002 sample 
 
Forecasting Firm ID Industry Classification Years in Blue Chip Sample for 
Current year forecast 
Bank of America Corp. 5 Commercial Bank Jan 1977- Jun 2003 
Bank One 6 Commercial Bank Apr 1981- Jun 2003 
Chamber of Commerce 17 Other Feb 1978- Jun 2003 
Comerica 25 Commercial Bank Jan 1990- Jun 2003 
Conference Board 26 Other Jan 1977- Jun 2003 
Daimler Chrysler AG 31 Industrial Corporation Jan 1984- Jun 2003 
DuPont 37 Industrial Corporation Jan 1977- Jun 2003 
Econoclast 39 Independent Jan 1984- Jun 2003 
Eggert Economic Enterprises 41 Other Jan 1977- Jun 2003 
Evans, Carrol and Associates 43 Independent Jan 1980- Nov 2002 
Ford Motor Company 48 Industrial Corporation Aug 1989- Jun 2003 
General Motors Corporation 50 Industrial Corporation Jan, Feb 1977,  Jan 1988- Jun 
2003 
Georgia State 52 Econometric Modeling Firm Feb 1984- Jun 2003 
Inforum- Univ. of Maryland 57 Econometric Modeling Firm Jan 1986- Jun 2003 
Macroeconomic Advisers, 
LLC 
70 Econometric Modeling Firm Jan 1985- Jun 2003 
Merrill Lynch 73 Econometric Modeling Firm Jan 1983- Jun 2003 
Morgan Stanley & Co. 79 Securities Firm Jan 1982- Jun 2003 
Motorola, Inc. 82 Industrial Corporation Apr 1993- Jun 2003 
National City Bank of 
Cleveland 
84 Commercial Bank Jan 1977- Jun 2003 
National Association of Home 
Builders 
85 Other Mar 1990- Jun 2003 
Northern Trust Company 89 Commercial Bank Apr 1983, Sep 1985-Jun 2003 
Perna Associates 91 Unknown Jan 1991- Jun 2003 
Prudential Financial 97 Other Jan 1977- Oct 2002 
Prudential Securities 98 Securities Firm Apr 1983- Jun 2003 
Siff, Oakley, Marks, Inc. 105 Independent Jan 1979- Jul 2002 
Standard and Poors 108 Other Jan 1994- Jun 2003 
Turning Points (Micrometrics) 111 Independent Mar 1989- Jun 2003 
U.S. Trust Co. 112 Commercial Bank Jan 1977- Jun 2003 
UCLA Business Forecast 114 Econometric Modeling Firm Mar 1977- Jun 2003 
Wayne Hummer & Co. 121 Independent Apr 1978- Jun 2003 
Wells Capital Management 122 Commercial Bank Jun 1991- Jun 2003 
 
Notes: All 31 forecasters appear consistently in the 1994-2002 period. The current year forecast is the 
forecast for the end of the year in which they are forecasting. The information for each forecaster is 
collected from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators newsletter. 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
Relationship between herding and accuracy in June and October (1994-2002) 
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Figure 3 (continued) 
Correlation between Herding and Accuracy in June and October (1994-2002) 
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Herding Propensity vs. Accuracy (1994-2002, October)
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